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Abstract 
 
This paper studies economic factors that affect a multinational’s decision between 
serving a foreign market via foreign direct investment (FDI) and setting up a joint venture (JV) 
with a local firm in the host country. The factors that we consider include the substitutability of 
products produced by competing firms, as well as the hotly debated intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) protection. In a simple North-South framework, we show that JV is the equilibrium 
market structure when the degree of R&D spillover is moderate, products are considerably 
substitutable, and IPRs strong. The government of South needs to maintain a minimum level of 
IRP to encourage an effective JV. For increasing social welfare, the South also needs to have a 
policy that limits foreign ownership in a JV.  
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1. Introduction  
The alliance of IBM and Lenovo made Lenovo the world’s third largest PC maker. 
Recently Lenovo formed a PC joint venture with Japanese PC maker NEC. As part of the deal, 
the companies said in a statement that they will establish a new company called Lenovo NEC 
Holdings B.V. to be registered in the Netherlands. NEC will receive $175 million from Lenovo 
through the issuance of Lenovo's shares. Lenovo, through a unit, will own a 51% stake in the 
joint venture, while NEC will hold a 49% stake. Our model seeks to theoretically analyze similar 
scenarios of the relationship between foreign direct investment, joint venture, and foreign 
ownership.  
With the development of international trade and globalization, firms are no longer limited 
to domestic production or domestic sales. There are several possible ways for multinational 
enterprises to enter a foreign market. The existing literature has mainly considered three different 
modes of serving a host country market. They are licensing, export, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
A great deal of research has discussed licensing in details. For example, Mukherjee (2007) 
examines different forms of licensing contracts. One objective is to explain these different 
possibilities as the results of the trade-off between incentives of saving transportation cost of 
exporting and reducing competition after licensing. Mukherjee (2010) further discusses the 
implications of both fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing on the competition and welfare of 
host counties under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Following Ethier and Markusen (1996), 
Saggi (1999) and Kabiraj and Marjit (2003), Sinha (2009) shows that a foreign firm can 
strategically choose licensing prior to its choice of an entry mode between export and FDI, which 
might result in a welfare loss for the host country depending on the structure of license fee. The 
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paper suggests the host country to utilize an optimal tariff scheme or a ban on licensing to 
maximize its social welfare.  
Two forms of foreign direct investments that directly involve the transfer of resources 
(such as capital, technology, and personnel) are FDI and JV. That is why many developing 
countries compete to attract FDI and encourage their firms to set up JVs with foreign firms, 
hoping to bring in advanced technology. The multinational enterprise (MNE) can build a sole 
ownership company (i.e., FDI) in the host country through the acquisition of an existing entity or 
the establishment of a new enterprise. Direct ownership provides a high degree of control in the 
operations but it requires a high level of resources and a high degree of commitment. An 
alternative strategy is to build a Joint Venture (JV) with a local firm. Possible benefits of forming 
a JV include political connections, existing facilities, and an efficient distribution channel.  
Sometimes the foreign firms have to build a JV in order to enter the local market when FDI is 
not allowed by local regulations. However, this partial ownership of JV cuts the degree of 
control over technology and intangible assets from the MNE. Thus, JV is commonly believed to 
have a higher possibility of technology spillovers. For example, Dimelis and Louri (2002) find 
that technology spillovers are stronger when foreign firms are in minority positions. Some 
empirical studies including Aitken and Harrison (1999), Liu (2002) and Javorcik (2004) provide 
supporting evidence for this view. 
It appears that relatively little research has been done to analyze the role of joint ventures 
in serving a foreign market. Muller and Schnitzer (2003) study JVs and technology transfer but 
the setting is much different from the present study. The authors discuss a game between a 
multinational enterprise and the host-country government under different policy structures and 
show how policy could be designed to make technology transfer profitable for both even with 
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high spillovers.  Leahy and Naghavi (2010) consider their study on FDI versus JVs to be the first   
theoretical work that investigates intellectual property rights (IPRs) issues surrounding JVs.  The 
authors use a simple Cournot Competition model similar to the model developed by Chin (1990).  
The analytical framework of Chin (1990) has been widely employed to discussing IPR and 
technology transfer problems such as Naghavi (2007). Leahy and Naghavi (2010) find that JV is 
the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. They also 
concluded that policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV can increase the welfare of the host 
countries. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the share of foreign ownership is 
exogenously given. 
In this paper, we attempt to endogenize the share of foreign ownership by applying a 
sharing rule widely used in the rent-seeking literature. We find that the equilibrium foreign 
ownership should be more than fifty percent. Further, our model differs from Leahy and Naghavi 
(2010) as we adopt a framework of product differentiation similar to the one in Ishikawa, Sugita, 
and Zhao (2009).  We find a range of product differentiation within which JVs could take place. 
Moreover, our analysis allow for the possibility that there is partial transfer of technology from 
the foreign firm to the JV. We also analyze conditions under which full technology transfer is 
optimal for the foreign firm. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
assumptions and structure of a simple North-South framework of imperfect competition to 
analyze issues on FDI and a JV.  Section 3 examines the production decisions of all firms and the 
R&D decision of the MNE under an entry mode. Section 4 discusses the equilibrium mode of 
entry regarding the values of each related parameter. Section 5 analyzes the share of profits 
between the Northern and the Southern inside partners, as well as the optimal degree of 
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technology transfer. In Section 6, we examine the impacts of FDI and JV on the host country’s 
consumer surplus and social welfare. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 7. 
 
2. The Model      
Basic Assumptions  
There are two local firms (denoted as S1 and S2) in the South and one foreign firm 
(denoted as F) from the North with superior technology. The Northern foreign firm attempts to 
enter the market in the South. Policies of the Southern government have been set before the 
Northern foreign firm entering the local market. We pay attention to interaction of the three firms 
in this Southern market. The foreign firm has to decide its mode of entry as either FDI or JV.  
We allow the Northern foreign firm and the Southern local firms to have differentiated products, 
so their products are not perfectly substitutable.  
There are good reasons for the Northern firm to form a joint venture with one of the 
Southern local firms such as to utilize the existing facilities and avoid fixed or set-up costs. A 
local firm may be willing to do so because the foreign firm posses a superior technology and the 
alliance can effectively reduce cost and competition. On the other hand, sharing of ownership in 
a JV will expose the foreign firm to higher risks of technology spillover if the IPRs are loose in 
the host country. This might be due to the fact that it is difficult to write a contract specifying 
exactly the right to use the intangible assets or technology and the mobility of skilled workers.  
The ownership structure is partially important when the multinational’s competitive advantage 
stems from intangible assets or technology leadership that can be costly to generate and easily 
imitate. Facing these trade-offs, the foreign firm may either enter the market by FDI or form a 
5 
 
joint venture (JV) with one of the Southern local firms by random match. If the JV takes place 
there will be two firms competing in the market. 
We will discuss a two-stage game here. At stage 0, the Southern government sets up its 
rules and regulations before the Northern firm enters the local market. In the first stage, the 
foreign firm chooses its mode of entry, the amount of technology transfer and the amount of 
cost-reducing R&D investment on technology.  In the second stage, the firms compete in the 
product markets. We allow for product differentiation in the analysis. The sequences of the game 
are summarized in Figure 2.1. 
 
           Figure 2.1  Sequence of the game  
  
For analytical simplicity, the (inverse) market demands facing the Northern foreign firm 
and the Southern local firms are taken to be:  
  1 2( )F F FP a q r q q                 (1a) 
and  
IPR & foreign 
ownership policy
FDI
R&D investment
Production decisions 
JV
R&D investment &
technology transfer
Production decisions
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  1 2( ),L L FP a rq q q                                                     (1b) 
where Fq  is the quantity of output produced by the foreign firm, 1q  and 2q  are respectively 
those of the local firms in the South with 1 2Q q q  . The parameter r (0 r  1) indicates the 
degree of substitutability between the foreign product and those of the local firms (with r = 0 
and r = 1 reflecting no and complete substitutability, respectively). The parameters Fa  and La  
represent market sizes. Product differentiation can be justified on the grounds that the foreign 
firm uses superior technology, which potentially leads to products that meet consumer demands 
better than local ones (Ishikawa, Sugita and Zhao, 2009).
1
 
In the present model, only the foreign firm that has superior technology will make R&D 
investments.  The Southern firms make no R&D investment. The South might lack the resources 
for R&D or the Southern firms may find it unprofitable to do so as it takes time for R&D to be 
turned into productivity.
2
 The Northern firm’s R&D aimed at inventing more efficient 
production technologies and hence takes a cost-reducing form. The unit cost functions for the 
foreign firm and the local firms are given, respectively, as 
gxCF   and LC ,                                                (2) 
where ( )ia   is the pre-innovative basic unit cost, ,i F L (noting that parameter  ia  represents 
the size of market as shown in the demand function in (1)), 2( / )x g  is the amount of cost-
                                                 
1
 For instance, when we talk about cell phones these days, everybody would want an iphone.  The price of a 3G 
iphone is almost double as a 3G phone from say Nokia with similar functions.  Even though a 3G Nokia phone may 
be as good as an iphone in terms of all the functions a phone could have, consumers are willing to pay a couple more 
hundred dollars for the iphone because Apple fans recognize them as different. 
2
 Small or median size firms may not even exist for a long period of time. 
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reducing R&D investment by the foreign firm, and g  indicates the effectiveness of the R&D 
process. 
In the case of a JV, we have to consider the situations that involve technology spillovers. 
Define   = bι , which captures the level of technology spillovers. The parameter   is itself a 
product of the absorptive capacity 0 ≤ b ≤ 1 (with b = 0 and b = 1 reflecting infinite and no 
absorptive capacity, respectively) and a measure of the weakness of IPR protection in the South 
0 ≤ ι ≤ 1 (with ι = 0 and ι = 1 reflecting full and no protection, respectively), and determines the 
degree of spillovers. 
 
3. Output Competition Stage 
Green field FDI case 
When the Northern foreign firm chooses to enter the local market through FDI, it 
competes with two Southern firms in the host country. It is usually assumed that fixed costs 
associated with FDI can be avoided or reduced by forming a JV to utilize already existing 
facilities of a local firm. Fixed costs of FDI are, however, left out of the model for simplicity.  
Adding fixed costs in the model will make JV more profitable and provide more incentives for 
the MNE to choose JV.  In the case of FDI, the profits of the three firms are: 
         xqgxqqrqa FFFF  )]()([ 21                (3a) 
and  
1 2[ ( ) ]Lj L F Lja rq q q q      ,                              (3b) 
where subscript F  represents that the foreign firm engages in FDI, and jL  denotes its rival local 
firms with 1,2.j   For simplicity, we let Aaa LF    for the rest of the analysis. In the 
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final stage of the game, firms compete in the product markets in a Cournot manner and choose 
their optimal output taking the levels of outputs by other firms as given. Solving for the 
equilibrium outputs for the firms yields 
2
(3 2 3 )
2(3 )
F
A rA gx
q
r
 


,            (4a) 
2
(2 )
2(3 )
Lj
A rA r gx
q
r
 


.                                           (4b) 
At the R&D investment stage, we assume that the foreign firm correctly foresees the 
equilibrium outcomes for product-market competition. We seek a solution that satisfies the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium. Fully informed of these outcomes, the Northern firm in the R&D 
stage chooses x  to maximize its total profits: 
    
2
2 2
(3 2 3 )
4(3 )
F
A rA gx
x
r

 
 

.                                              (5) 
Substituting the equilibrium outputs derived in equation (4) into the profit function of the 
Northern firm in (5) and taking the differentiation of the latter with respect to ,x  we derive the 
optimal level of R&D investment: 
    
2 2
*
2 2 2
(9 6 )
[4(3 ) 9 ]
A g r
x
r g


 
.                                                     (6) 
It is instructive to examine the relationship between *x  and .r  Taking the derivative of 
*x  with 
respect to r yields  
 2 2 2* ]
2 2 3
108 3 2 [3 4(3 ) ( 1)
[4(3 ) 9 ]
A g r g r rx
r r g
    
  
 
which implies that 
    
*
0x
r
 

 for 2 24
3
(3 )( 1) .g r r     
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It follows from the above analysis that for  gg , we have 
*
0.x
r
 

  This indicates that the 
higher the value consumers placed on the foreign product produced by a better technology (i.e., 
r  is closer to 0) the higher the level of R&D investment undertaken by the foreign firm (i.e., 
*x  
is higher).  It can also be seen that the more effectiveness the cost-reducing R&D (i.e., g ) the 
higher the level of R&D investment by the foreign firm.  That is, 
*
0.x
g
 

  
This result is similar 
to that in Leahy and Naghavi (2010).   
Substituting *x  in equation (6) into the profit functions of the firms, we have their 
optimal profits as follows:  
       
2 2
2 2
(2 3)
4(3 ) 9
F
A r
r g



 
,                                                                  
(7) 
   
2 3 2 2
2 2 2
(12 2 4 6 3 )
[4(3 ) 9 ]
Lj
A r r r g
r g

   

 
.                                           (8) 
We assume 3 2(12 2 4 6 ) / 3g r r r     to ensure that all firms produce nonnegative 
outputs and earn nonnegative profits. It comes as not a surprise that there is a positive association 
between the foreign firm’s profits and the effectiveness of its R&D. Interestingly, a very high 
value of g  will drive the Southern firm out of the market, but this special case is not our focus 
here. 
JV case 
Now we look at the situation when the foreign firm forms a JV with a local firm to serve 
the local market. We allow the foreign firm to partially transfer its superior technology, the level 
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of which is denoted as 0   1 (with  =0 and  =1 reflecting zero and full technology transfer 
respectively). This could be true as it might not always be in the best interest of the foreign firm 
to transfer its superior technology one hundred percent to a JV in real economy investment 
environment. We can think of several reasons for this, the foreign firm can face regulations of 
ownership from the local government which stop it from the gain of fully technology transfer. 
We assume a JV maximizes joint profits whoever firm holds the decision power and a fixed 
share of profits go to each partner. The profits of the firms under JV are 
 [ ( ) ( ) (1 )] [ ( ) ]J J o J J o Ja q rq gx q x A q rq gx q x                       (9a) 
and 
  ooJoJo qgxqrqAgxqrqa ))(()]1()()([   ,       (9b) 
where A a   , subscript J representing a JV and O representing the Southern outside firm.  
We solve for the optimal levels of outputs produced by the JV firm and the outside firm as 
follows: 
2
1 (2 2 )
4
Jq A gx Ar r gx
r
    

        (10a) 
and 
2
1 (2 2 ).
4
oq A Ar r gx gx
r
    

                         (10b) 
We also solve for the optimal level of R&D investment undertaken by the JV firm as 
2 2 2 2
*
2 2 2 2 2
( 2) ( 2)
[( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
r A g r
x
r r g r
 
 
 

   
                                (11) 
It follows from equation (11) that we have the following comparative static derivatives:     
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 3
2 ( 2) ( 2) [ ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
0;
[( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
A g r r g r r rx
r r g r
   
  
       
    
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 3
2 ( 2)( 2) [ ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
0.
[( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
A gr r r g r r rx
r r g r
   
  
       
    
 
These results indicate that R&D investment is an increasing function of  , but is a decreasing 
function of  . 
Substituting *x  into the profit functions of the firms, we have 
          
2 2( 2)
J
A r
H


              (12a) 
2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( 2 4 2 2 8)
o
A r r gr gr r g g
H
    

      
 ,            (12b)                                                                      
where 2 4 2 2 2 2 2(16 8 4 4 ) 0H r r g gr gr          . 
The next step of the analysis is to analyze the entry mode decisions of the Northern firm by 
comparing the equilibrium profits as derived earlier. To do so, we analyze this issue in the next 
section. 
 
4. The equilibrium choice of an entry mode 
Joint venture arises as the optimal choice when it can generate extra rent to be shared by 
the Northern firm and the Southern inside firm.  If either the local inside firm or the MNE cannot 
get as much in JV as in FDI, they will have no incentive to form a JV. Therefore, a possibility 
frontier exists for the values of the parameters under which a JV is the equilibrium choice of the 
entry mode. That is, the JV firm’s overall profit should be no less than the sum of the foreign 
profit and the inside local firm’s profit in FDI. Such a boundary satisfies the following condition:  
   IFJ   .   
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Substituting J  from equation (12a), F  from equation (7), and I  from equation (8) 
into the above condition yields  
 
222
22
22
2
2222
2
)9)3(4(
))3)(2(23(
9)3(4
)32(
)2()2()2(
)2(
gr
rrg
gr
r
rgrr
r








 
       (14) 
Keeping any pair of the four parameters constant, we can find the relationship of the other pair. 
Assuming the case of a full technology transfer (i.e., 1 ) and 100 percent research 
effectiveness (i.e., g =1), we have from (14) that there is a combination of   and r  within 
which JV is the equilibrium outcome. Figure 4.1 reflects the relationship in the above critical 
condition; regions underneath the lines are where a JV could be formed. As no curve exists for 
  > 0.5 and r < 0.5, Figure 4.1 illustrates for simplicity a case with a partial range of   and 
r .
3
 
The analysis indicates that JV takes place only when the products of the MNE and the 
local firms are not substantially different. Intuitively, if the product of the MNE is so unique and 
the technology used is so exclusive, the MNE cannot take advantage of the existing facilities in 
the host country. Under these circumstances, the MNE will prefer to have complete ownership 
and decide to undertake FDI for the purpose of preventing technology spillovers when IRP 
protection is low and technology easy to copy. Even though the local firms would like to accept 
JV, the Northern firm will not offer it. When the products of the Northern and Southern firms are 
closer, the MNE can take advantages of the existing facilities while the South can enjoy the 
superior technology to reduce production costs. Both firms have incentives to join in the alliance. 
When we have 100% R&D and a full technology transfer, JV takes place only between firms 
whose products are at least 70% substitutable. If the IPR protection is stricter in the local market 
                                                 
3
 To see this in full range, refer to Appendix A-1. 
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which makes JV more profitable, there will be more probabilities for firms producing 
differentiated goods when forming a JV( the range of r becomes larger). 
 
 
 
                Figure 4.1.   A range of   and r  that leads to a JV 
 
 
The above analysis leads to  
PROPOSITION 1. Increasing the level of IPR protection in the South (that is, lowering the 
value of  ) reduces the losses due to imitation of the JV technology by the outsider firm and,  
consequently, increases the range of r  over which a JV occurs. 
The relationship between   and   under JV when g =1, r =1 is shown in Figure 4.2.   
The figure illustrates that JVs are only offered and accepted when the degree of technology 
transfer is significantly high. If the IPR protection is stricter, JV becomes profitable even with 
less degree of technology transfer. The values of parameters should also satisfy the constraint 
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
r
ß
JV 
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JV
JV
F
FDI
F    for the JV to be the equilibrium choice of the entry mode. We find that the 
minimum technology transfer rate is mim 0.84779  for  = 0, g = 1, r =1. 
 
 
            Figure 4.2. The relationship between   and   under JV 
 
 
Based on the above analysis, we have 
PROPOSITION 2. Increasing the level of IPR protection in the South (that is, lowering the 
value of  ) reduces the losses resulting from technology spillovers, consequently, increases the 
range of    over which a JV occurs. 
As the value of g  decreases, the curve in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 will move down and 
completely disappear when R&D effectiveness is smaller than a reasonable amount, see 
Appendix A-1 with graphs showing the full range of the two parameters. The higher research 
effectiveness, more room exists for JV to be formed. When r =1 and  =1, we get a graph for the 
relationship of   and g  within which JV can take place similar to the result of Leahy (2010), 
shown as Figure 4.3. 
0.80 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1.00
0.0
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0.3
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0.5
d
ß
JV 
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           Figure 4.3   The relationship of   and g  that leads to a JV 
 
  
From the above analysis, we have 
PROPOSITION 3. Increasing the level of the IPR protection in the South (that is, lowering the 
value of  ) increases the range of R&D efficiency (i.e. g ) over which a JV emerges as the 
market equilibrium. 
Leahy (2010) finds estimates for the absolute maximum value of   to be 0.348 that leads 
to JV.  From the graphs presented in the present study, we find that the absolute maximum value 
of   consistent with a JV is no greater 0.4. This result is consistent with the findings of Leahy 
(2010). JV takes place only when the level of intellectual property rights protection is 
sufficiently high so that the insiders can exploit the advantages of merging. The proposition here 
is that raising the IPR protection in the South (lowering  ) reduces the potential losses due to 
spillover or imitation of the JV technology by the outsider firm. This increases the range of g  
over which a JV occurs. 
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5. Bargaining in a joint venture 
In this Section, we will determine the share of JV profits between the Northern firm and 
the Southern inside firm. Defining the share of the Northern firm as   (where 0 ≤  ≤ 1), the 
share of the Southern inside firm is 1- . This is the departure of our analysis from earlier studies 
in the literature that focus on the extreme cases when = 0 or 1 (e.g., Lin and Saggi, 2004; and 
Leahy and Naghavi, 2010).   
We assume the rule to decide the share is that the two parties will equally split the gain 
from form a JV. The two parties will receive exactly the same amount of extra net profit from JV 
compared to their profit under FDI. The gain that goes to each party within JV will be equal. 
Therefore, the optimal value of   can be derived by solving for   that satisfies the equality 
condition:  
JVF
FDI
L
JV
I
FDI
F    
where the subscript I represents the inside Southern firm). This optimal value of   is (see 
Appendix A-2): 
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2
*
2 2 2 2 22
(4 8 4 16) (2 3) (3 6 4 2 12)1
4(3 ) 9 [4(3 ) 9 ]2 2( 2)
g r r gr gr r g r r r
r g r gr
                 
      
.   
                (15)                                                                        
It follows from the above equation that *  
2
1 . This indicates that the foreign firm should own 
more than 50% of the JV profits. When  =0,  =1, r =1, g =0, *  takes the minimum value of 
2
1 . This is what we should expect under free trade. It makes sense under the assumption of equal 
split of potential win from the JV as the foreign firm has better technology thus more market 
share in FDI compared to the local firms. 
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By taking the derivative of *  with respect to  , we find that for a large range of g <
3
5  
(almost all possible values of g within which a JV will be formed),

 *  0 , see Appendix A-4. 
The foreign firm will ask for a higher share of the JV profits if the degree of technology spillover 
increases. If intellectual property rights are protected better in the local market, the Northern firm 
may be willing to accept a lower share of the JV profits. Similarly, we find that the foreign firm 
can accept a smaller share when JV uses a more advanced technology (i.e., a higher  ) for g<
3
5 . 
It is not hard to understand that when the technology transfer rate increases a smaller share of the 
relatively higher JV profits can match up with a larger share of the relatively lower JV profits. 
In reality, however, many countries do not allow foreign firms to own more than 50% of 
JV profits. For example, the upper limit of foreign ownership in China’s domestic banks is 
currently 25%. If a JV is formed, this regulation will make the local inside firm more profitable 
at the expense of a foreign firm. The foreign firm can only receive this upper limit amount of 
share  < * , whether it will accept this as a second best choice or affect the rate of technology 
transfer will be analyzed later.  
For a JV to take place, the MNE should get at least as much as what they would get from 
FDI, which means that  needs to satisfy J  F . We denote this minimum value of   as 

~
 and we find  
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2
(4 8 4 16) (2 3)
4(3 ) 9 ( 2)
g r r gr gr r
r g r
        
  
  
                               (16)              
After considering all the possible values of the parameters, we find that the value of   
should be no less than 0.56. In some cases a lower bound on foreign ownership may be desirable.  
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This can explain why Chinese local governments actually design the tax system so as to put a 
lower bound on foreign ownership in JVs (see, for example, Bai et al., 2004).  
The issue of interest concerns the equilibrium rate of technology transfer. The Northern 
firm wants to earn as much profit as possible from the JV such that JF    in JV. After 
taking the differentiation of F  with respect to ,  we find the preferred rate of technology 
transfer from the perspective of the North firm should be 1 in our model if JV is the equilibrium 
choice under our above fair trade assumption.  
2 2 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
( 2) ( 2)
0
(4 8 4 16)
F A g r r
g r r gr gr
  
    
  
 
     
.                        
When the foreign firm cannot obtain this unconstrained optimal share and instead accepts 
a certain share   due to the ownership regulation of the Southern government, we find the 
preferred technology transfer rate remains to be 1 since  
 
2 2 2
2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2
2 ( 2) ( 2)
(4 8 4 16)
F A g r r
g r r gr gr
  
    
   

     
0 . 4                      
This 100% technological transfer decision should be welcomed by the South. But this result 
emerges under the situation that JV is the equilibrium entry mode chosen by the foreign firm. 
 
6. Welfare of the South 
In stage 0, the South government has the first mover advantage in setting its policies that 
maximizes its social welfare. As in the trade literature, we assume that social welfare is the sum 
of domestic profits and consume surplus. That is, 
                                                 
4
 The mathematical derivation for 
F



 is shown in Appendix A-3. 
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i
SS
i CSW  21   for  or ,i FDI JV            (16) 
noting that  
))(2)(( 22
2
1 YXrZYXZCS             (17) 
for  X, Y, and  Z  as the quantities of the differentiated goods produced by the firms in the 
alternative cases of FDI and JV.  
The consumer surplus measures under the entry modes of FDI and JV are:  
  
2 4 3 2 2 2 2 3
2 2 2
2 [ (9 12 6 60 18 72) ( 3) (25 4 20 8 )]
[4(3 ) 9 ]
FDI A g g r r r r r r r rCS
r g
         

 
                  (18) 
and 
2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2
[2( 2)( 2) ( 1)( 2)]
2[ ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
JV r r g rCS A
g r r r
  
 
    

   
  
            
2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2
2(1 )( 2) ( 2)[ ( 1)( 2) ( 2)( 2) ]
.
2[ ( 2) ( 2) ( 2) ]
r r r g r r r
A
g r r r
  
 
       

   
       (19)  
From (18) we can tell for less R&D intensive industries, consumers will prefer a lower 
level of IPR protection to benefit from the lower price and more quantities.  However, consumers 
will support stricter IPR protection for higher R&D effectiveness producers to encourage their 
research effort in innovation.  
Substituting the equilibrium quantities from equation (8) and (17) into iW  in equation 
(16), we obtain the welfare under FDI as follows: 
2 2 4 3 2 2 2 2 3
2 2 2
2 [18 12 6 84 18 144 ( 3) (41 20 16 8 )]
.
[4(3 ) 9 ]
FDI A g gr gr gr gr g r r r rw
r g
         

 
      (20) 
Similarly, substituting the equilibrium quantities from equations (12) and (18) into  iW  in 
equation (16), we obtain the welfare under JV (for  < * ) as follows: 
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JVw =
2222
222222
)2()2()2(
))2)(2()2)(1(()1()2(

 
rrrg
rrrgArA


+
22222
22222222
))2()2()2((2
))2)(2()2)(1(()2()2)(1(2))2)(1()2)(2(2(


rrrg
rrrgrrrArgrrA


                                           (21) 
We can calculate JVw  when   *  in similar way. The only difference between JVw
when  < *  and   *  comes from the profit of the Southern insider firm.  
Generally, we can calculate JVw and 
FDIw  for each industries in the South by simply 
plugging in the specific values of r  and g . We then can find the optimal value of   that 
maximizes social welfare under JV. The South government can intentionally choose a level of 
IRP protection to approach this   that maximizes its social welfare. By comparing (20) and 
(21), we find for a wide range of g  that JV is the socially preferred choice. It should be noted 
that FDI can be socially superior to a JV and the Southern government should use measures to 
deter the JVwhen R&D intensity is extremely high or low. We show this case in Figure 6.1. 
From the previous analysis of this paper, we already know that JVw  will be higher in value when 

~
  < *  so that JV turns out to be the equilibrium outcome. We illustrate this case in Figure 
6.2.   
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           Figure 6.1  Welfare of the South (case 1) 
 
 
 
  
          Figure 6.2  Welfare of the South (case 2) 
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Therefore, when JV is the socially optimal outcome, the Southern government can design 
dual policies to limit the foreign ownership of the JV and defer FDI to increase the welfare of the 
South. The latter case is discussed in Sugita et al.(2009) when the foreign firm is not allowed to 
undertake FDI and has to form a JV with one of the local firms but the inside local firm will still 
exist after the JV is formed.   
PROPOSITION 4. For a medium range of g , JV is optimal for the South, while FDI is socially 
superior on two ends outside this medium range.  An upper limit regulation on foreign ownership 
is always an optimal policy for the South as it generates higher welfare for all the possible 
values of g  when JV is a socially optimal choice. 
We have shown that the value of r  takes a constant number within (0.8,1) for our 
previous analysis. When r  approaches 1, we have the special case similar to the one discussed in 
Leahy and Naghavi (2010). Our analysis also leads to the conclusion that for a large mid-range 
of g , JV is optimal for the South, while FDI is socially superior on the two ends outside this 
range of g . In the case when JV is the preferred outcome there is a socially optimal level of   
that maximize JVw . Accordingly, the Southern government should set IPRs that approach this 
optimal level of  . 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have conducted a partial equilibrium analysis in the context of a 
competition between a single Northern producer and two Southern producers selling 
differentiated good in the host market. In the analysis, only the Northern firm has the ability to 
conduct R&D in order to lower its production costs, but the Southern firms can imitate with zero 
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cost if patent protection for process innovations is not perfectly enforced by the government of 
the South. 
The MNE is driven by the fear of technology spillovers and the incentive of reducing 
competition to choose between FDI and JV. Two Southern firms can become the friend or foe of 
the Northern firm on the random match basis. Following our simple analysis, we show that a 
joint venture takes place only when the effectiveness of R&D is within an intermediate level and 
the goods produced by the Northern and Southern firms are substantially close enough. We find 
the share of JV profits earned by the foreign firm or the foreign ownership should be more than 
50% under the assumption of equal split of the gain from a joint venture. If the level of 
technology spillovers is low and the rate of technology transfer is high, the Northern firm is 
likely to accept a smaller share of JV profits and vice versa. When technology transfer 
considerations are accounted for, it is not rational for governments in less developed countries to 
oppose IPR protection. Although the South may desire a lower level of IPR protection to reach 
its first-best welfare, it does not necessarily mean that it is the best interest of the South to violate 
the trade-related IPRs. We assume that as long as there is a demand, the North will serve the 
South by one way or another, however, the North may leave the South market. If that is the case, 
it will definitely provide more incentives for the South to provide IPR protection. In fact, a 
minimum IPR protection should be maintained to attract foreign investment to JV. At the same 
time, regulations on foreign ownership can facilitate technology transfer as long as it is high 
enough that the JV will be the equilibrium market outcome. Sometimes a lower limit on foreign 
ownership and policies that limit FDI such as a tax will increase the Southern welfare. 
Of course, the theoretical findings of this paper are subject to some special assumptions 
imposed in the analysis. There may be different ways that the model can be further extended.  
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Our model considers a case close to merger and it might be interesting to also look at the case 
when the North firm chooses to build a new JV with one of the Southern firms but the two local 
firms will still exist. Future studies could also look at the case when Southern firms are allowed 
to bid the opportunity of becoming the insider of JV.   
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